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Abstract—We propose and solve a stochastic dynamic pro-
gramming (DP) problem addressing the optimal provision of
bidirectional regulation service reserves (RSR) by pools of duty
cycle appliances. Using our previously introduced concept of
packetized energy, the approach (i) models the dynamics of the
utility U(T ) that each consumer associates with a block/packet
of energy when the prevailing temperature is T in the appliance
specific comfort zone, and (ii) derives a dynamic pricing policy
that closes the loop between time varying appliance specific
utilities and a regulation signal broadcast by the Independent
System Operator (ISO) every 4 seconds. Since T evolves dy-
namically as a function of past energy block purchases and
heat losses, T and U(T ) are time varying. Consumer utility
levels U(T ) are modeled by the probability distribution of utility
levels across the ensemble of all idle appliances at time t.
This probability distribution provides a statistic of the detailed
appliance specific utility information which is sufficient for the
determination of an optimal pricing policy. Moreover, it can
capture appliance specific diversity within comfort zone limits
and temperature-utility function relationships. Dynamic pricing
policies investigated in the literature assume that this ensemble
probability distribution is time invariant and in fact uniform.
A contribution of the work that follows is the replacement of
this unrealistic simplifying assumption with the introduction
of a new state variable modeling the aforementioned dynamic
probability density function. The new state variable evolves as
a function of the dynamic pricing policy which aims to track
the centrally broadcast regulation signal trading off optimally
between tracking error and appliance energy consumption utility.
We specifically model active and idle appliances by means of a
closed queuing system with price-controlled transitions from the
idle to the active queue. Empirical evidence indicates that the
dynamically changing frequency distribution of appliance specific
utilities is closely approximated by a trapezoid-shape distribution
function characterized by a single dynamic parameter which is in
fact the aforementioned sufficient statistic. The optimal provision
of RSR is addressed within a DP framework where we (i) derive
an analytic characterization of the optimal pricing policy and the
differential cost function, and (ii) prove optimal policy mono-
tonicity and value function convexity. These properties enable
us to implement a smart assisted value iteration (AVI) and an
approximate DP (ADP) algorithm that exploit related functional
approximations. Numerical results demonstrate (1) the validity of
the solution techniques and the computational advantage of the
proposed ADP on realistic, large-state-space problems, and (2)
that the RSR provision based on the optimal control that respects
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dynamic consumer preferences has higher tracking accuracy
relative to approaches assuming static uniformly distributed
consumer preferences.
Index Terms—Approximate dynamic programming, smart
grid, electricity demand response, regulation service reserves,
demand responce under dynamic preferences.
I. INTRODUCTION
The urgently needed reduction of CO2 emissions will rely
on the adoption of significant renewable electricity generation,
whose volatility and intermittency will result in commensurate
increase in the provision of secondary or Regulation Service
Reserve (RSR) required to ensure power system stability
through adequate Frequency Control (FC) and Area Control
Error (ACE) management [1], [2], [3], [4]. The provision
of these additional RSRs from centralized generation units,
until now has been the primary approach, is expensive and
poses a major challenge to massive renewable integration.
The option of employing much lower cost demand-control-
based RSR is rightly a major Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission target [5]. Not surprisingly, there is extensive
literature on demand management addressing, for example,
direct load control (DLC) of thermostatic appliances to provide
frequency reserve or load shedding [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11],
[12], [13], the optimal coordination of distributed resources in
a micro-grid flexible loads [14], [4], [15], and real time pricing
approaches to reduce peak demand [16], [17], [18]. In contrast
to DLC where consumers transfer the control of powering
their appliances to a centralized decision maker, dynamic
price directed demand response by individual consumers can
achieve similar system benefits with lower consumer utility
loss. The PNNL Olympic Peninsula project [19] is a successful
pilot study where consumer specified price elasticities have
been used to control thermostatic appliance by dynamic prices
that proved superior to fixed or peak/off-peak prices.
Customer acceptance of price directed demand response,
however, requires that customer preferences are modeled accu-
rately and that dynamic prices are adapted to these preferences.
In this paper we focus on the deployment of bidirectional
regulation service reserves (RSR) by a pool of duty cycle
cooling appliances in a smart building or neighborhood micro-
grid. Based up-to-date consumer preferences and the current
price signal, the microgrid operator will purchase and allocate
a block or packet of energy at the beginning of each cycle.
Dynamic prices encourage (or discourage) idle appliances to
purchase a packet of energy and start a cycle. Two distinct time
scales, one hour and 4 seconds, are involved in promising and
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2deploying RSRs. A smart building promises to the Independent
System Operator (ISO) a certain quantity of up and down RSR
in the hour ahead market and is compensated at the hour ahead
markets RSR clearing price. During this hour, however, the
smart building must deploy these reserves to track the RSR
signal that is rebroadcast by the ISO at 4 second intervals
taking values in the interval from -100% to +100%. Optimal
deployment of the RSRs at the 4 second time scale is defined
as the deployment driven by dynamic prices decided at the
same 4 second time scale by the smart building operator, so as
to maximize the average utility of cooling appliances over the
hour. The smart building operator can not anticipate the ISO
RSR signal, but it has access to a statistical model describing
its stochastic dynamics during the relevant hour [7], [20].
To obtain the optimal dynamic pricing policy, we propose
and solve an infinite horizon discounted cost stochastic dy-
namic programming (DP) problem. The hour long horizon is
considered for all intents and purposes to be infinite relative
to the 4 second time scale characterizing the regulation signal
and price updates. State variables consist of the RSR signal
level y(t), the direction D(t) of RSR signal defined as the sign
of y(t)− y(t − 1), the number of connected appliances i(t),
and the sufficient statistic Tˆ (t) characterizing the probability
distribution of utility level. More specifically, we model the
dynamics of the utility that each space conditioning appliance
enjoys from the consumption of a block/packet of energy
purchased when the prevailing temperature is at a specific
level T ∈ [Tmin,Tmax] within the appliance specific temperature
comfort zone. The utility at time t is modeled as an affine
function of the temperature T prevailing at time t. The utility
of purchasing a packet of energy by a cooling appliance will
be low when its temperature is close to Tmin, and high when
it is close to Tmax. To model diversity among appliances, co-
efficients are appliance specific independent random variables
and is normalized by |Tmax−Tmin|. The variable T at a specific
appliance evolves dynamically as a function of that appliance’s
past trajectory of energy block purchases and heat losses, and
hence T and U(T ) are time varying. The optimal pricing
policy, however, does not require individual appliance utility
levels at time t. The sufficient information is captured by the
probability distribution of utility levels across the ensemble
of all idle appliances at time t. This probability distribution is
therefore the sufficient statistic that replaces appliance specific
utilities in the stochastic DP state vector.
The principal contribution in what follows is a model-
ing extension in which the system state is a time varying
probability density function that we argue provides important
information about the dynamics of aggregated effects of indi-
vidual consumer utility functions. This represents a significant
improvement over the more traditional models (e.g. [7], [21],
[20]) that assume a virtually infinite pool of homogeneous
users and appliances whose preferences are static and inde-
pendent of the recent history of price control signals. Our
approach provides a more appropriate level of granularity that
will enhance the value of RSRs that come from finite pools
of duty-cycle appliances. The concepts to be described may
also have useful applications in related areas such as dynamic
pricing policies in the context of Internet service and mobile
telephony bandwidth management [22], [23], [24], [25]. The
bottom line message of the paper is that in communication
between consumers and service providers, it is important to
stop relying on the uniform and time invariant assumption and
thereby avoid ratepayer revolt [26].
Focusing on a smart building with a finite number of duty
cycle cooling appliances, we use a dynamic probability distri-
bution to represent cooling zone specific occupant preferences
to transition their appliance from an idle to an active state. This
is achieved by employing a dynamically evolving sufficient
statistic that captures the ensemble of idle cooling zone appli-
ance preferences, namely the recent-price-trajectory-dependent
probability distribution of a sampled cooling zone occupant’s
reservation price. Moreover, we improve the tractability of the
DP formulation by (i) deriving an analytic characterization of
the optimal policy and the differential cost function, and (ii)
proving useful monotonicity and convexity properties. These
properties motivate the use of appropriate basis functions to
construct a parametrized analytic approximation of the value
function used to design an approximate DP (ADP) algorithm
[27] that estimates optimal value function approximation pa-
rameters and near optimal policies. To support the relative
advantage of our approach, we compare the real time RSR
tracking performance of our dynamic utility based optimal
dynamic pricing policy to that of a uniform static utility based
dynamic pricing policy. The tracking of our policy will be
shown to be clearly superior.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Sec.II we
establish a DP problem by describing the state dynamics,
the sufficient statistic of cooling zone preferences, the period
costs, and the Bellman Equation. Time is quantized into 4-
second intervals, and the electricity used by the appliances
is also quantized using our previously announced concept
of packetized energy. Sec.III compares the static uniform
distribution representation of cooling zone preferences adopted
in past work, with the proposed dynamic and non-uniform
preference distribution formulation. More specifically, it uses
the Bellman equation to prove analytical expressions relating
the optimal policy to partial differences in the value function.
Sec.IV proves monotonicity properties of the differential cost
function and the optimal policy. It also discusses asymptotic
behaviour of optimal policy sensitivities as the number of
appliances becomes large. Sec.V utilizes the proven properties
of the value function and the optimal control policy to propose
and implement (i) an assisted value iteration algorithm, and (ii)
a parametrized approximation of the value function. It also
develops an ADP approach for estimating the value function
approximation parameters. Numerical results demonstrate the
superior performance of dynamic utility versus static utility
modeling pricing policies. Sec.VI concludes the paper and
proposes future directions.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider an advanced energy management building with
N cooling appliances. The smart building operator (SBO)
contracts to regulate in real time its electricity consumption
within an upper and a lower limit {n¯−R, n¯+R} agreed upon
3in the hour-ahead market, where n¯ is the constant energy
consumption rate that the SBO purchased in the hour ahead
market, and R is the maximum up or down RSRs that the
SBO agreed to provide in the hour-ahead market. n¯ equals the
average number of active appliances, which is related to the
average number of duty cycles per hour required to maintain
the cooling zone temperature within its comfort zone for the
prevailing outside temperature and building heat transfer prop-
erties. R is chosen as a fraction of N that can be determined
based on the appliance response property, such as cooling rate.
In real time, the ISO would broadcast the RSR signal y(t) to
the SBO, which is the output of a pre-specified proportional
integral filter of observed Area Control Error (ACE) and
System Frequency excursions. The RSR signal y(t) has an
average value of 0 during each hour and its dynamics can be
modeled as a Markov process [28]. Given these three values,
the SBO assumes the responsibility to modulate its energy
consumption to track n¯+ y(t)R with y(t) ∈ [−1,+1] specified
by the ISO in almost real time (usually every 2 or 4 seconds).
To this end the SBO broadcasts a real time price signal pi(t)
to all cooling appliances to modulate the number of connected
appliances i(t) and hence control the aggregated consumption.
Appliances will detect price at rate λ to resume cooling by
comparing its utility U(T ) to pi(t).1 Appliances utility values
depend on their corresponding cooling zone temperature T . In
this paper U(T ) is a monotonically increasing function of T
over T ∈ [Tmin,Tmax]. Once U(T )>= pi(t), the appliance will
connect and consume an packet of energy having departure
rate µ . (1/µ equals the average time it takes a cooling
appliance to complete the consumption of an energy packet.)
See [8], [29] where the associated electric power consumption
is defined as a packet of electric energy needed to provide the
work required by a single cooling cycle.
The RSR signal tracking error, e(t) = i(t)− n¯− y(t)R, and
occupant utility realizations constitute period costs. The objec-
tive is to find a state feedback optimal policy that minimizes
the associated infinite horizon discounted cost. Individual cool-
ing zone preferences are modeled by a dynamically evolving
probability distribution of idle appliance zone temperatures
pt(T ). Assuming a known relationship connecting cooling
zone preferences to temperatures, we derive the probability
distribution of preferences pt(T ) (or derived utility levels) for
cooling appliance activation as well as the sufficient statistics
Tˆ (t) that characterizes pt(T ). We next describe system dy-
1In this paper we assume consumers to have the same sensitivity preference
across zones, namely parameter b in the utility function is fixed such that
the mapping between temperature threshold and the price signal is bijective.
However, Tmin and Tmax are not the same for all consumers. |Tmin − Tmax|
is normalized by the sensitivity parameter b. Alternative implementations
in the literature rely on similar approaches, but, in our opinion, less likely
to be accepted by consumers. For example, the PNNL Olympic Peninsula
project [19], has assumed the presence of aggregators, who, typically provide
participants with multiple comfort level choices, and participants choose the
comfort level based on their own preferences. Aggregators group participants
into multiple subgroups based on their choices. Different groups of partic-
ipants are characterized by different price elasticities and provide different
type of reserves. For example, a participant group with the highest elasticity
provides regulation service reserves (RSR) with a response time of 4 seconds.
Participant groups with medium price elasticity provide spinning reserves with
response times of 15 to 30 minutes. Participant groups with low price elasticity
provide capacity reserves that have even slower response times.
namics, and formulate the period cost function of the relevant
stochastic dynamic problem.
A. State Dynamics
The state variables contain i(t),y(t),D(t) and Tˆ (t). Queues
i(t) and N− i(t) constitute a closed queuing network where
the service rate of one queue determines the arrival rate into
the other. Queue N− i(t) behaves like an infinite server queue
with each server exhibiting a stochastic Markov modulated
service rate that depends on the control u(t) and the probability
distribution pt(T ). Queue i(t) behaves also as an infinite
server queue with each server exhibiting a constant service
rate µ . The dynamics of y(t) and the dependent state variable
D(t) = sgn[y(t)− y(t−4sec)] are characterized by transitions
taking place in short but constant time intervals, τy2, resulting
in y(t) staying constant, increasing or decreasing by a typical
amount of ∆y = τy/300sec [28]. These transitions are outputs
of a proportional integral filter operated by the ISO whose
inputs are system frequency deviations from 60 hz and Area
Control Error (ACE). Since the frequency deviation and ACE
signal can be approximated by a white noise process resulting
from imbalance between stochastic demands and supply, y(t)
is then an unanticipated random variable which is described
by memoryless transitions that depends only on the current
value. Therefore we can approximate y(t) by a continuous
time jump Markovian process that allows us to uniformize the
DP problem formulation. To uniformize the DP problem we
introduce a control update period of ∆t << τy which assures
that during the period ∆t , the probability that more than one
event can take place is negligible. We further set the time unit
so that ∆t = 1, and scale transition rate parameters accordingly
and derive the following state dynamics.
1) Dynamics of y(t): The transition probabilities of the dis-
crete time Markov process y(t) depend on y(t) as well as D(t)
[7], [20], which is y(t)’s changing direction, either positive or
negative, for every 4 seconds. D(t) = sgn[y(t)− y(t− 4sec)].
Statistical analysis on historical PJM data on y(t) trajectories
indicate a weak dependence on y(t) yielding the reasonable
approximation:
Prob(y(t+ τy) = y(t)+∆y|D(t) = 1) = 0.8
Prob(y(t+ τy) = y(t)−∆y|D(t) = 1) = 0.2
Prob(y(t+ τy) = y(t)−∆y|D(t) =−1) = 0.8
Prob(y(t+ τy) = y(t)+∆y|D(t) =−1) = 0.2
.
Denoting by γu1 (γ
d
1 ) the rate at which y(t) will jump up by
∆y during a control update period when D(t) = 1 (D(t) =
−1), and by γu2 (γd2 ) the corresponding rate that y(t) will jump
down when D(t) = 1 (D(t) =−1), and selecting these rates to
correspond to the exponential rates that are consistent with the
geometric probability distribution described above we have:{
γu1 = 0.8∆t/τy,γ
u
2 = 0.2∆t/τy
γd2 = 0.8∆t/τy,γ
d
1 = 0.2∆t/τy
2This varies across ISOs. In PJM it is either 2 or 4 seconds depending on
the type of regulation service offered.
4Setting the control update period as the operative time unit,
i.e., ∆t = 1, we have the following uniformized dynamics of
y(t): 
Prob(y(t+1) = y(t)+∆y|D(t) = 1) = γu1
Prob(y(t+1) = y(t)−∆y|D(t) = 1) = γu2
Prob(y(t+1) = y(t)−∆y|D(t) =−1) = γd2
Prob(y(t+1) = y(t)+∆y|D(t) =−1) = γd1
.
2) Dynamics of i(t): The dynamics of i(t) is governed by
the following arrival and the departure rates.
The arrival rate a(t) depends on the policy u(t). Denote
by pu(t) the proportion of idle appliances with cooling zone
temperature T ≥ u(t). As described in the notation subsection,
idle appliances observe the price broadcast by the SBO at
a rate λ , and decide to connect and resume cooling when
the price is smaller than their utility for cooling at time t.
Therefore the arrival rate into i(t) is
a(t) = [N− i(t)]λ pu(t) = (N− i(t))λ
Tmax∫
u(t)
pt(T )dt, (1)
namely a(t) equals the product of the number of idle appli-
ances that observe the broadcast price times the probability
that T ≥ u(t).
The departure rate d(t) is independent of u(t), It equals
the product of active appliances times the departure rate of a
cooling cycle. Modeling the consumption of an energy packet
as an exponential random variable with rate µ such that 1/µ
equals the average cooling cycle duration, the departure rate
is
d(t) = i(t)µ. (2)
The stochastic dynamics of i(t) in the homogenized model is
thus given by i(t + 1) = i(t)+ i˜ where the random variable i˜
satisfies the following probability relations p(i˜ = 1) = a(t)p(i˜ =−1) = d(t)p(i˜ = 0) = 1−a(t)−d(t)− γ,
where γ = γu1 + γ
u
2 = γ
d
1 + γ
d
2 is the total probability that the
ISO RSR signal will change.
Fig. 1 represents the stochastic dynamics of the number
of active and idle appliances as a two queue closed queuing
network with queue levels summing to N.
Fig. 1. Dynamics of the closed queuing network with infinite number of
servers. The service rate at the active appliance queue is constant, while it is
Markov modulated at the idle appliance queue.
3) Dynamics of D(t): Recalling that D(t) = sgn[y(t)−
y(t − 4sec)], it is clear that the dynamics of D(t) are fully
determined by the dynamics of y(t). We next show that the
dynamics of Tˆ (t) are also determined by the dynamics of y(t).
4) Dynamics of Tˆ (t): Based on related work in HVAC
system modelling [9] and [30], we use standard energy transfer
relations to simulate the dynamics of the frequency histogram
of idle appliance cooling zone temperatures, which appear
to conform to a three parameter functional representation
pt(T ) = f (Tˆ (t),Tmin,Tmax). We simulate two RSR signals
from the ISO for the observation of the time varying prob-
ability distribution of consumers’ temperature. The first is a
standard ISO RSR signal trajectory that aspiring RSR market
participants must respond to in order to demonstrate that they
have the ability to track. This is referred to in the PJM manual
as the standard T-50 qualifying test [28]. The second is a real
time signal downloaded from PJM [31]. We record the tem-
perature levels prevailing across the N cooling zones when a
control trajectory is applied that results in near-perfect tracking
of the ISO RSR requests implied by the aforementioned two
signals. Assuming standard heat transfer relationships, exten-
sive simulation reported below indicates that the time evolution
of the probability distribution of cooling zone temperatures
conforms to a dynamically changing trapezoid characterized
fully by Tˆ (t), see Fig. 2. pt(T ) is the probability density
function (pdf) of T at time t, T ∈ [Tmin,Tmax]. Tmin and Tmax
are the threshold values of room temperature that determine
the appliance cooling zone occupant’s comfort zone. εh is of
small value and approximated to be zero. Trapezoid has base
(Tmin,0) to (Tmax,0) and top side (Tmin,h) to (Tˆ ,h) where
h = 2/(Tmax + Tˆ − 2Tmin). Note that Tˆ and hence h are time
varying quantities. We will using p(T ) to denote the pdf by
dropping the time index in derivation and proof if time is not
considered.
Fig. 2. Trapezoid probability distribution function p(T ) with T ∈ [Tmin,Tmax]
parametrized by a single parameter Tˆ . Simulation shows that εh is of small
value and assumed to be zero throughout paper. The height of the trapezoid
is h = 2/(Tmax + Tˆ −2Tmin).
Fig. 3 shows the accuracy of using a trapezoid probability
distribution to represent idle appliance cooling zone temper-
atures obtained from a Monte Carlo Simulation of the price
controlled system. We discretize the temperature into 20 states
and simulate a total number of 16000 appliances to observe
a smooth probability distribution. The duty cycle on and off
time are both 10 minutes. The price detection rate from idle
appliances is 1 minute. PJM’s RSR signal is broadcast every
4 seconds. In Fig. 3, the numerous black curves are the actual
5probability distribution recorded at different time stamps for
trapezoids characterized with Tˆ (t) = 5,6,7,8. The red curve
is the mean value of the set of black curves taken at each
temperature state. The red curve is then approximated by
the trapezoid green curve proposed in Fig. 2. Tˆ (t) and the
trapezoid approximation are then the mean statistics of the
actual frequency distribution of the temperature distribution.
Note that the trapezoids are completely specified by two static
quantities, Tmin and Tmax, forming the base of the trapezoid,
and the time varying quantity Tˆ (t) that determines the height
of the top horizontal side. It should be noted that the trapezoid
approximation is based on the assumption of (1) small value
of εh = 0 and (2) equal probability pt(T ) for temperature
T ∈ [Tmin, Tˆ ]. In this paper, we model the trapezoid distribution
based on the single sufficient statistics Tˆ , future work will
consider modeling the preference distribution with additional
statistics to fully capture the distribution shape.
Fig. 3. Trapezoid probability distribution function p(T ) with T ∈ [Tmin,Tmax]
parametrized by a single parameter Tˆ . Height of the trapezoid is h= 2/(Tmax+
Tˆ −2Tmin).
The upper left plot in Fig. 4 shows the time evolution of the
trapezoids representing the idle appliance cooling zone tem-
perature histograms throughout time when we are simulating
the RSR tracking for the real signal. The upper right plot is
the contour plot of the number of appliances where we can
see clearly a time varying trapezoid distribution shaping the
preferences. We filter the contour plot to get Tˆ in lower right
figure. Based on the time series recorded for y(t) (lower left
figure) and Tˆ (t), we find a strong anti-correlation between the
two vectors in both simulation for the T-50 standard signal
and the real RSR signal that are given by -0.9833 and -0.8106,
respectively. We propose the regression of Tˆ (t) on y(t) with
the following linear function
Tˆ (t) = α0+α1y(t)+ω, (3)
where α0 corresponds to the value of Tˆ (t) when the building’s
energy consumption level is n¯, α1 < 0, and ω is a zero mean
symmetrically distributed error. These results not only explain
most of the variability but are also sensible and conform
with our expectations. Indeed, large values of y(t) indicate
a history of repeated broadcasts of low prices to achieve high
consumption levels requested by the ISO. Small values of Tˆ (t)
approaching Tmin are observed for high y(t) levels, while for
low levels of y(t), Tˆ (t) is large. These findings support our a
priori expectation that y(t) is a reasonable sufficient statistic
of past state and control trajectories in the information vector
available at time t. This a priori expectation is based on the fact
that y(t) levels are in fact integrators of recent price control
trajectories. The verification of expectations by actual observa-
tions justifies the adoption of a tractable dynamic utility model
conforming to the dynamics Tˆ (t)=α0+α1y(t)+ω where ω is
a zero mean symmetric random variable. Since the SBO is able
to observe the actual cooling zone temperatures through its
access to Building Automation Control (BAC), the dynamics
above are adequate for optimal control estimation. We finally
note that the mapping of temperature to consumption utility
allows the dynamic and past-control-dependent distribution of
cooling area zone temperatures to provide a dynamic and past-
control-dependent distribution of cooling area consumption
utility levels. In the end, Fig. 5 shows the actual Tˆ (black
curve), the predicted Tˆ (red curve) based on linear regression,
and the error between the two values. It can be seen that
the error is zeros mean and symmetrically distributed that is
consistent with our assumption in proposing (3).
Fig. 4. Monte Carlo simulation is used to determine the time evolution of
temperature histograms in idle appliance cooling areas. We observe that these
histograms conform to a time varying trapezoid shape with Tˆ (t) a linear
function of the ISO RSR signal y(t).
B. Period Cost
The period cost consists of two parts: a penalty for deficient
ISO RSR signal tracking and the utility realized by appliance
users. The penalty for deficient tracking rate at time t is defined
as:
g(i(t),y(t)) = K[
i(t)− n¯− y(t)R
R
]2, (4)
where K is the penalty per unit of deficient tracking. Defining
κ = K/R2 we can write the penalty for deficient tracking as,
g(i(t),y(t)) = κ[i(t)− n¯− y(t)R]2. (5)
6Fig. 5. Original Tˆ and the regression based prediction of Tˆ are shown in
the upper figure. The linear regression explains 81.06% of the uncertainty
of Tˆ . Errors are observed to be Gaussian noise satisfying the assumption of
regression.
The expected utility realized from a group of idle appliances
can be calculated by three components: (1) the number of
idle appliances, N− i(t), that can potentially connect, (2) the
connection probability of each appliance, pu(t), that depends on
the dynamic frequency distribution pt(T ), and (3) the utility
rate per connection, which is the expected monetary value
per connection calculated by consumers’ temperature based
utility function U(T ) and the probability distribution of room
temperature T . It should be noted that while the utility for a
given consumer is determined by his room temperature T , for
a group of consumers the aggregated utility is based on the
frequency distribution of room temperatures of the group, and
therefore depends on pt(T ) instead of T .
For a given price signal pi(t), there is a threshold tem-
perature value u(t) obtained by solving pi(t) =U(u(t)). Idle
appliances having temperature at least u(t) will connect. The
consequent expected utility value realized by each connecting
cooling appliance is
Uu(t) =
Tmax∫
u(t)
U(T )pt(T )dT
Tmax∫
u(t)
pt(T )dT
. (6)
Denoting a(t) as the expected number of connections from the
idle appliance group, the period expected utility value is
a(t)Uu(t) = [N− i(t)]λ pu(t)Uu(t),
= [N− i(t)]λ
Tmax∫
u(t)
pt(T )dt
Tmax∫
u(t)
U(T )pt (T )dT
Tmax∫
u(t)
pt (T )dT
,
= [N− i(t)]λ
Tmax∫
u(t)
U(T )pt(T )dT.
(7)
Equations (5) and (7) imply that the total cost rate is
c(i(t),y(t),u(t)) = κ[i(t)− n¯− y(t)R]2−
[N− i(t)]λ
Tmax∫
u(t)
U(T )pt(T )dT.
(8)
C. Bellman Equation
The state variables can be grouped according to their
dependence on u(t): i(t) depends explicitly on u(t). Tˆ (t)
is also dependent on the past trajectory of controls, but, to
the extent that this trajectory is consistent with a reasonable
tracking the ISO RSR signal, it can be considered as a function
of y(t), which, as discussed earlier, is the sufficient statistic
of this trajectory. We can thus consider all state variables,
other than i(t), to have dynamics that do not depend on u(t).
For notation simplicity we let i¯u(t) = {y(t),D(t) = 1, Tˆ (t)}
(i¯d(t) = {y(t),D(t) =−1, Tˆ (t)}) to be the state variables that
make up the complement of i(t) when the RSR signal is going
up (down), so that {i(t), i¯u(d)(t)} is the representation of the
full state vector. Given the cost function and dynamics de-
scribed above, we can formulate an infinite horizon discounted
cost problem with the following Bellman equation for states
including D(t) =−1.
J(i, i¯d) = min
u∈[Tmin,Tmax]
{
g(i, i¯d)−a(t)Uu
+α[a(t)J(i+1, i¯d)+d(t)J(i−1, i¯d)
+γd1 J(i, i¯
u+∆y)+ γd2 J(i, i¯
d−∆y)
+(1−a(t)−d(t)− γd1 − γd2 )J(i, i¯d)]}. (9)
J(i, i¯d) is the value function satisfying the Bellman equation,
with α denoting the discount factor. For notational simplicity
we denote by i¯u+∆y the new state realized when the regulation
signal increases from y(t) to y(t + 1) = y(t) +∆y rendering
D(t + 1) = 1, while the rest of the state variables remain
unchanged. Similarly we denote by i¯d−∆y the new state when
the regulation signal decreases from y(t) to y(t+1) = y(t)−∆y
rendering D(t + 1) = −1, while the rest state variables re-
main unchanged. The superscripts u (d) standing for upwards
(downwards) RSR signals. J(i, i¯u) can be written similarly with
minor notational changes.
III. UTILITY REALIZATION AND OPTIMAL POLICY
A. Uniform Utility Probability Distribution Model
For illustration purposes, we start with a simple utility
function that represents a linear relationship between cooling
zone temperature and utility enjoyed by activating an idle
appliance and allowing it to embark on a cooling cycle
U(T ) = b(T −Tmin). (10)
The utility increases proportionately to the cooling zone tem-
perature T . If p(T ) were selected to be a static and uniform
probability distribution, as is the case with work published so
far, the expected period utility rate would be a conveniently
7concave function of u. Indeed, using (7) we can obtain that
the expected period utility rate
a(t)Uu = (N− i(t))λ
Tmax∫
u
U(T )p(T )dT,
= (N− i(t))λ
Tmax∫
u
b(T −Tmin) 1Tmax−Tmin dT,
= (N− i(t))λ b(Tmax−u)(Tmax+u−2Tmin)2(Tmax−Tmin) ,
(11)
is a concave function of the policy u.
In general, this concavity property of the expected period
utility rate holds for broader class of utility functions U(T,b,ε)
– where T is the temperature, b is the utility sensitivity,
and ε is a consumer specific value to characterize individual
utility preference. We require two properties hold for the
utility function: (i) we need ε to be a random parameter
independent of T , and (ii) Eε [U(T,b,ε)] is a monotonically
increasing function of T . We prove this property by the
following reasoning. Taking expectation on Uu in (6), we have
Uu =Eε

Tmax∫
u(t)
U(T,b,ε)p(T )dT
Tmax∫
u(t)
p(T )dT
=
Tmax∫
u(t)
Eε [U(T,b,ε)]p(T )dT
Tmax∫
u(t)
p(T )dT
.
(12)
Taking the derivative of the expected utility rate a(t)Uu with
respect to u
d
du a(t)Uu =
d
du (N− i(t))λ
Tmax∫
u
U(T )p(T )dT,
= − (N−i(t))λTmax−Tmin Eε [U(u,b,ε)].
(13)
Since Eε [U(u, p,ε)] increases with u, we have
d
du Eε [U(u, p,ε)]> 0, which leads to
d2
du2
a(t)Uu =− (N− i(t))λTmax−Tmin
d
du
Eε [U(u, p,ε)]< 0 (14)
Hence the expected period utility rate is a concave function
of the policy u.
B. Generalized Utility Probability Distribution Model
The concavity property no longer holds true under the
realistic modelling of p(T ) by a dynamic trapezoid charac-
terized additionally by the time varying quantity Tˆ . Indeed,
the realistic representation implies the following consumers’
preferences distribution
p(T ) =
{ 2
Tmax+Tˆ−2Tmin , T ≤ Tˆ ,
2(T−Tmax)
(Tˆ−Tmax)(Tmax+Tˆ−2Tmin) , T ≥ Tˆ .
For example, if we use a linear utility function as in (10), it
yields the following expected period utility rate
a(t)Uu
=

[N− i(t)]λ 2b(C1− 12 u2+Tminu)
Tmax+Tˆ−2Tmin , u≤ Tˆ ,
[N− i(t)]λ 2b(C2−
1
3 u
3+
Tmin+Tmax
2 u
2−TminTmaxu)
(Tˆ−Tmax)(Tmax+Tˆ−2Tmin) , u≥ Tˆ .
(15)
where C1 and C2 are some constants. The introduction of a
dynamic ˆT (t) dependent p(T ) removes the concavity of the
expected utility rate since the second derivative of the expected
utility is
d2
du2
a(t)Uu ∝ Tmin+Tmax−2u. (16)
And therefore the expected period utility rate is con-
cave for u ∈ [Tmin,max(Tˆ , Tmin+Tmax2 )], and convex for u ∈
[max(Tˆ , Tmin+Tmax2 ),Tmax].
Under the static uniform probability distribution p(T ), the
optimal policy can be easily obtained since we can set deriva-
tive to zero to get a local maximum which is also global. In
addition, we proceed to show that a unique optimal policy
exists as well under dynamic p(T ) circumstances. We do this
by showing first that a local maximum exists, and then prove
that only one local maximum exists, and hence it is the global
maximum as well.
C. Optimal Price Policy
We define the differential of the value function J(i, i¯d) w.r.t.
the active appliance state variable i(t) as
∆(i+1, i¯d) = J(i+1, i¯d)− J(i, i¯d).
Using the Bellman equation, we can express the optimal policy
u(i, i¯d) in terms of ∆(i+1, i¯d)
u(i, i¯d) = argminu g(i, i¯d)−λ (N− i)puUu+
α
{
iµJ(i−1, i¯d)+λ (N− i)puJ(i+1, i¯d)+
γd1 J(i, i¯
u+∆y)+ γd2 J(i, i¯
d−∆y)
+[1− (iµ+λ (N− i)pu+ γd1 + γd2 )]J(i, i¯d)
}
,
= argmaxu puUu−α pu∆(i+1, i¯d),
(17)
where the second equation is obtained by neglecting terms that
are independent of u. Letting
f (u,∆(i+1, i¯d)) = puUu−α pu∆(i+1, i¯d), (18)
we can write that the optimal policy must satisfy
max
u∈[Tmin,Tmax]
f (u,∆(i+1, i¯d)). (19)
Proposition 1 In the conventional assumption where con-
sumers’ utility preference is statically uniformly distributed
(Tˆ = Tmax), f (u,∆(i+1, i¯d)) is a concave function of the policy
u in the allowable control set. The optimal policy is obtained
either at the boundary of the allowable control set or at u?
satisfying ddu f (u,∆(i+1, i¯
d))|u=u? = 0.
Proposition 1 is straightforward because the first term in
f (u,∆(i, i¯d)) is quadratic and the second term is a linear
function of u for Tˆ = Tmax. When Tˆ < Tmax with p(T )
no longer uniform but trapezoid, f (u,∆(i+ 1, i¯d)) no longer
possesses the concavity property which under Proposition 1
guaranteed that a local maximum is the global maximum.
We therefore proceed to prove existence and uniqueness as
follows.
Proposition 2 For trapezoid consumers’ preference distri-
bution p(T ) with Tˆ < Tmax and non-homogeneous preferences
function U(T,b,ε) having monotonically increasing expected
8value Eε [U(T,b,ε)], the optimal policy that solves (19) is
described by the following relations
u(i, i¯d)=
 Tmax, if α∆(i+1, i¯
d)≥ Eε [U(Tmax,b,ε)]
Tmin, if α∆(i+1, i¯d)≤ 0
I−1(α∆(i+1, i¯d)), otherwise
(20)
where I−1(α∆(i+1, i¯d)) is the inverse function of the expected
utility function satisfying Eε [U(u,b,ε)] = α∆(i+1, i¯d).
Proof. Let f (u,∆(i+1, i¯d)) = pu(Uu−α∆(i+1, i¯d)), for the
three conditions in (20) we claim the following:
1) When α∆(i+ 1, i¯d) ≥ Eε [U(Tmax,b,ε)], namely α∆(i+
1, i¯d) is no less than the maximum possible utility per con-
nection, we always have Uu−α∆(i+ 1, i¯d) ≤ 0. Since Uu−
α∆(i+1, i¯d) is a monotonically increasing function and pu≥ 0
is a monotonically decreasing function of u, f (u,∆(i+1, i¯d))
reaches its maximum value at u = Tmax. On the other hand,
if u(i, i¯d) = Tmax which is the optimal policy, we must have
α∆(i+1, i¯d)≥ Eε [U(Tmax,b,ε)]. To see this necessity, assume
that α∆(i+1, i¯d)< Eε [U(Tmax,b,ε)], then there exists a policy
u 6= Tmax such that Eε [U(Tmax,b,ε)] >Uu > α∆(i+1, i¯d) and
pu > 0. Hence f (u,∆(i + 1, i¯d)) > 0 = f (Tmax,∆(i + 1, i¯d)),
which is a contradiction to the assumption that u(i, i¯d) = Tmax
is optimal.
2) When α∆(i + 1, i¯d) ≤ 0, both −puα∆(i + 1, i¯d)) and
puUu are monotonically decreasing function of u. Therefore
f (u,∆(i+1, i¯d)) reaches its maximum at u = Tmin.
3) When α∆(i+1, i¯d) ∈ (0,Eε [U(Tmax,b,ε)]), we can take
the derivative of f (u,∆(i+ 1, i¯d)) as f (u,∆(i+ 1, i¯d)) is con-
tinuously differentiable on (Tmin,Tmax).
d
du f (u,∆(i+1, i¯
d)),
= ddu [puUu−α pu∆(i+1, i¯d)],
= ddu [
Tmax∫
u
Eε [U(T,b,ε)]p(T )dT −α∆(i+1, i¯d)
Tmax∫
u
p(T )dT ],
= −p(u)[Eε [U(u,b,ε)]−α∆(i+1, i¯d)].
(21)
Denoting u(i, i¯d) as the optimal control that minimizes
f (u,∆(i+1, i¯d)), a necessary condition is to have u(i, i¯d) be a
local maximum of f (u,∆(i+1, i¯d)). Therefore it satisfies the
first order condition
p(u)[Eε [U(u,T,ε)]−α∆(i+1, i¯d)]
∣∣
u=u(i,i¯d) = 0. (22)
According to the proof in 1), p(u) = 0 (u(i, i¯d) = Tmax) if and
only if α∆(i+1, i¯d)≥ Eε [U(Tmax,b,ε)]. Therefore in this case
p(u) 6= 0. The only solution to satisfy (22) is
Eε [U(u(i, i¯d),b,ε)]−α∆(i+1, i¯d) = 0. (23)
Based on the definition of the inverse function, we have
u(i, i¯d) = I−1(α∆(i+1, i¯d)). (24)
For the second order condition, it can be verified that
d2
du2 f (u,∆(i+ 1, i¯
d))

u=u(i,i¯d) < 0. Therefore u(i, i¯
d) is a local
maximum. Moreover, given f (u,∆(i + 1, i¯d)) is first order
differentiable, ddu f (u,∆(i+ 1, i¯
d)) is continuous and has only
one critical point inside the allowable control set, then the
local maximum is the global maximum for u ∈ [Tmin,Tmax],
namely u(i, i¯d) = I−1(α∆(i+1, i¯d)). 
Remark 1 The optimal policy characterization between
u(i, i¯d) and ∆(i + 1, i¯d) does not rely on p(T ), namely it
holds for broader possible realizations of consumers’ real time
preferences. This is because (23) has only one solution which
is the local and global optimal bearing the same argument
in the proof. In addition, it holds for broader class of utility
function (linear, quadratic, etc) and non-homogeneous utility
incorporating consumer specific preference ε .
Remark 2 The optimal policy is determined by balancing
(1) the utility rewards from connected consumers, and (2)
the differential of the optimal cost viewed as an estimate
of the value function difference across two adjacent states.
Consumers utility sensitivity b plays the following role: When
b increases, then the optimal policy will decrease for the same
value of ∆(i+1, i¯d). In the extreme case when b→∞, we have
u = Tmin namely the lowest price is broadcast to guarantee
the largest possible utility reward; when b→ 0, the optimal
controller is bang-bang depending on the sign of ∆(i+ 1, i¯d)
indicating that consumers become extremely elastic.
Remark 3 The three cases in Proposition 2 correspond to
different geometry of f (u,∆(i+1, i¯d)); see Fig. 6. With differ-
ent choice of utility function and ∆(i+1, i¯d), f (u,∆(i+1, i¯d))
can be a monotonically increasing function of u that leads to
the optimal control u(i, i¯d) = Tmax, or it can be a monotonically
decreasing function to render u(i, i¯d) = Tmin, or can be a non-
concave and non-monotonic function whose local maximum
is the global maximum on (Tmin,Tmax).
Fig. 6. Geometric features of f (u,∆(i, i¯d)). (1) f (u,∆(i, i¯d)) is monotonically
decreasing when α∆(i+1, i¯d)≤ 0. Optimal policy is u= Tmin. (2) f (u,∆(i, i¯d))
has unique global maximum when α∆(i+1, i¯d) ∈ (0,Eε [U(Tmax,b,ε)]). The
function may not be concave for Tˆ 6= Tmax. (3) f (u,∆(i, i¯d)) is monotonically
increasing when α∆(i+1, i¯d)≥ Eε [U(Tmax,b,ε)]. Optimal policy is u= Tmax.
IV. PROPERTIES OF THE OPTIMAL POLICY
Proposition 2 expresses the optimal policy u(i, i¯d) as a
function of ∆(i, i¯d). To study the properties of u(i, i¯d), we
focus on the structure of ∆(i, i¯d). In this section we derive
key properties of ∆(i, i¯d) in terms of the changes in state
space variables that lead to desirable structures for u(i, i¯d).
There are three state variables that affect u(i, i¯d): the aggregate
9consumption over all active appliances i(t), the ISO RSR
signal y(t), and the tracking error e(t) = i(t)− n¯−y(t)R. When
two of the three variables are given, the third variable can
be expressed accordingly by i(t)− y(t)R− e(t) = n¯ since n¯ is
fixed. To study the structure of ∆(i, i¯d) as a function of i(t),
y(t), and e(t), we fix one variable each time and allow the
other two to vary. Before proceeding, we prove the following:
Lemma 1 Denote
φ(∆(i+1, i¯d)) = max
u∈[Tmin,Tmax]
puUu−α pu∆(i+1, i¯d), (25)
then φ(∆(i+1, i¯d)) is a monotonically non-increasing function.
Proof. For saturated optimal control u(i, i¯d) = Tmin or
u(i, i¯d) = Tmax, pu(i,i¯d) and Uu(i,i¯d) are constant and the state-
ments stand. When the optimal control is not saturated, namely
u(i, i¯d) = I−1(α∆(i+1, i¯d)) as in the last scenario in Proposi-
tion 2, we have
dφ(∆(i+1,i¯d))
d∆(i+1,i¯d)
=
[
d puUu
du |u=u(i,i¯d)−α∆(i+1, i¯d) d pudu |u=u(i,i¯d)
]
du
d∆(i+1,i¯d)
−α pu(i,i¯d)
= −[E[U(u(i, i¯d),b,ε)]−α∆(i+1, i¯d)] p(u(i, i¯d)) dud∆(i+1,i¯d)
−α pu
= −α pu ≤ 0.
Therefore φ(∆(i+ 1, i¯d)) is a monotonically non-increasing
function of ∆(i+1, i¯d). 
In addition to the monotonicity properties of φ(∆(i+1, i¯d)),
we derive upper and lower bounds on the change in φ(∆(i+
1, i¯d)) with respect to a change in ∆(i+ 1, i¯d) shown in the
following Lemma:
Lemma 2 φ(∆(i+ 1, i¯d))− φ(∆(i, i¯d)) has the following
upper and lower bound:
(1) φ(∆(i+ 1, i¯d))− φ(∆(i, i¯d)) ≤ −α pu(i,i¯d)(∆(i+ 1, i¯d)−
∆(i, i¯d)).
(2) φ(∆(i+1, i¯d))−φ(∆(i, i¯d))≥−α pu(i−1,i¯d)(∆(i+1, i¯d)−
∆(i, i¯d)).
Proof. (1). The proof is straightforward
φ(∆(i+1, i¯d))−φ(∆(i, i¯d))
= [puUu−α pu∆(i+1, i¯d)]

u=u(i,i¯d)
−[puUu−α pu∆(i, i¯d)]

u=u(i−1,i¯d)
≤ [puUu−α pu∆(i+1, i¯d)]

u=u(i,i¯d)
−[puUu−α pu∆(i, i¯d)]

u=u(i,i¯d)
= −α pu(i,i¯d)(∆(i+1, i¯d)−∆(i, i¯d)).
(26)
The inequality holds because φ(∆(i, i¯d)) is evaluated at u =
u(i, i¯d) rather than at the optimal policy u = u(i− 1, i¯d), and
therefore it results in a higher than the optimal cost which
yields an upper bound.
(2) Similarly
φ(∆(i+1, i¯d))−φ(∆(i, i¯d))
= [puUu−α pu∆(i+1, i¯d)]

u=u(i,i¯d)
−[puUu−α pu∆(i, i¯d)]

u=u(i−1,i¯d)
≥ [puUu−α pu∆(i+1, i¯d)]

u=u(i−1,i¯d)
−[puUu−α pu∆(i, i¯d)]

u=u(i−1,i¯d)
= −α pu(i−1,i¯d)(∆(i+1, i¯d)−∆(i, i¯d)).
(27)
This inequality holds also by a similar argument. 
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 provide the monotonicity prop-
erty as well as bounds on φ(·) function differences between
adjacent states. We next use these bounds to prove three
monotonicity properties of ∆(i, i¯d) with respect to state space
parameter changes in RSR signal value y, current aggregated
demand i, and tracking error e. Properties of ∆(i, i¯d) will be
used to prove the main Theorem on the structure of the optimal
policy at the end of the section.
A. Monotonicity of ∆(i, i¯d(u)) for Key State Space Parameters
We first discuss the monotonicity of ∆(i, i¯d) for a fixed
ISO RSR signal y. In this case i¯d will be fixed and i, e will
change in the same direction. ∆(i, i¯d) represents the optimal
value difference between two adjacent states having only one
consumption difference. Proposition 3 provides properties of
∆(i+1, i¯d) when state space variable i¯d is fixed while i varies.
Proposition 3 The following properties hold for a fixed y:
(1) ∆(i+ 1, i¯d) ≥ ∆(i, i¯d)+ ε l , where ε l = 2κ1−α[1−2(λ+µ)−υ ]
with υ = λ (N−N1).
(2) ∆(i, i¯d)+ εu ≥ ∆(i+1, i¯d), where εu = 2κ1−α[1−2(λ+µ)] .
Proof. See Appendix A.
Remark 4 Since both ε l and εu are positive, we have ∆(i+
1, i¯d) > ∆(i, i¯d). The optimal value function J(i, i¯d) exhibits
convex-like behavior for a given i¯d , in the sense that
J(i+1, i¯d)+ J(i−1, i¯d)> 2J(i, i¯d). (28)
This convexity property can be used to design approximate
DP (ADP) algorithms with convex functional approximation.
We explore this possibility in Sec. V.
We next discuss the monotonicity of ∆(i, i¯d) for a fixed
tracking error e with i¯d and i changing accordingly. Since
one of our objectives is to accurately track the ISO RSR
signal, it is reasonable to speculate that the SBO would use
the same optimal policy for states {i, i¯d} and {i+1, i¯d +∆y}
that have the same e, and therefore it is reasonable to have
∆(i+1, i¯d +∆y) = ∆(i+1, i¯d +∆y). However, this speculation
ignores the fact that the expected consumer arrival rate and
the expected period utility reward will be different if same
policy is used since the queuing system is closed and the total
number of appliances is finite (different current consumption
i infers different number of counterpart idle appliances). We
formally investigate the properties of ∆(i, i¯d) for a given e and
state the monotonicity properties as follows.
Proposition 4 The following properties hold for a fixed e:
(1) ∆(i, i¯d)≥ ∆(i+1, i¯d +∆y).
(2) ∆(i + 1, i¯d + ∆y) + ε¯u ≥ ∆(i, i¯d) where
ε¯u = α(λ+µ)1−α[1−(λ+µ)]ε
u.
The proof of Proposition 4 is similar to the proof of
Proposition 3. We omit the proof due to page limitation.
In the end, we derive a last property when the aggregated
consumption i is fixed while the ISO RSR signal y and tracking
error e = i− i¯− yR change in the same direction.
Proposition 5 The following properties hold for a fixed i:
(1) ∆(i, i¯d)≥ ∆(i, i¯d +∆y)+ ε l .
(2) ∆(i, i¯d +∆y)+ εu+ ε¯u ≥ ∆(i, i¯d).
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Proof. We have
∆(i, i¯d)≥ ∆(i+1, i¯d +∆y)≥ ∆(i, i¯d +∆y)+ ε l , (29)
where the first (second) inequality is the direct result of Propo-
sition 4 (3). And similarly the second part of the proposition
holds. 
The above proposition completes our discussion of the
properties of the differential cost function ∆(i, i¯d). These
properties and the relation between ∆(i, i¯d) and u(i, i¯d) result
in the following useful properties of the optimal policy in the
next section.
B. Monotonicity Properties of the Optimal Policy u(i, i¯d)
Based on Propositions 3, 4, and 5, we present the follow-
ing theorem as the main result illustrating the monotonicity
properties of the optimal policy u(i, i¯d).
Theorem 1 The following properties hold for the state
feedback optimal policy u(i, i¯d) for all {i, i¯d}:
(1) For the same RSR signal, the optimal price policy is
a monotonically non-decreasing function of i. Namely u(i+
1, i¯d)≥ u(i, i¯d) .
(2) For the same tracking error, the optimal price policy is a
monotonically non-increasing function of i. Namely u(i, i¯d)≥
u(i+1, i¯d +∆y).
(3) For the same consumption level, the optimal price policy
is a monotonically non-increasing function of i¯d . Namely
u(i, i¯d)≥ u(i, i¯d +∆y).
Proof. The proof is straightforward. From Proposition 3, 4,
and 5 we have
∆(i, i¯d)≥ ∆(i+1, i¯d +∆y)≥ ∆(i, i¯d +∆y).
From Proposition 2 the optimal control is a non-decreasing
function of the ∆(i, i¯d), therefore
u(i, i¯d)≥ u(i+1, i¯d +∆y)≥ u(i, i¯d +∆y),
and the three statements above are true. 
Remark 5 The policy monotonicity properties are valid for
both D(t) = 1 and D(t) =−1. Bang-bang optimal control will
be used when greater imbalance exists between the aggregated
consumption and ISO regulation signal level. When the state
is at a high value of i and a low value of i¯d , the ISO would
broadcast highest price signal. When the state has a small
value of i and a large i¯d , the SBO would broadcast a lower
price signal. Otherwise, the SBO would broadcast the optimal
price in between.
Remark 6 The three monotonicity properties can be in-
terpreted as follows: we set a low price for states with a
higher RSR signal, and a high price for states with a higher
aggregate consumption. When the tracking error is the same,
a high current consumption suggests a smaller number of
disconnected appliances, which means we have a smaller
number of appliances that are able to respond to the SBO’s
signal. In such cases, a lower price is chosen to achieve a
larger percentage of disconnected appliances.
C. Monotonicity of Price Sensitivity w.r.t. N
We investigate the change in the optimal price sensitivity
with respect to the number of connected appliances i, as
the total number of appliances N and the maximum Reserve
obligation R increase both in a constant proportion. Consider
a SBO who provides regulation reserves R equal to a fixed
proportion q of the duty cycle appliances N 3, namely R= qN.
Note that q can be determined by cooling appliance user
preferences, appliance technical specifications, etc [32]. As N
and R increase at the same rate, the effective penalty parameter
κ = K/R2 will decrease. In addition, the uniformized policy
update interval ∆t and discount factor α will change as N
increases following the relationships:
∆t =
1
N max(λ ,µ)+ γ
≈ 1
N max(λ ,µ)
, (30)
and
α =
1
1+ r∆t
(31)
where r is the prevailing discount rate. Substituting (30) into
(31) we can write
α =
N max(λ ,µ)
r+N max(λ ,µ)
. (32)
Observing that both the discount rate and the policy update pe-
riod increase as N increases, we show by Proposition 6 that the
change in the value function differentials ∆(i+1, i¯d)−∆(i, i¯d)
and ∆(i, i¯d)−∆(i, i¯d +∆y) approaches zero as N approaches
infinity.
Proposition 6 εu and ε l , defined in Proposition 3, and ε¯u,
defined in Proposition 4, will decrease as N increases, and
moreover for N→ ∞, their asymptotic limit is 0.
Proof. Using explicitly ∆t which for notational simplicity
was selected as the time unit and set equal to 1 in the proof
of Proposition 3, we can write
εu =
2κ∆t
1−α[1−2(λ +µ)∆t ] . (33)
Substituting into (33) the effective discount factor α and the
relation ∆t ≈ 1/(N max(λ +µ)) we obtain
εu(N) =
2K/(qN)2
N max(λ ,µ)
1− N max(λ ,µ)r+N max(λ ,µ) [1−2(λ +µ) 1N max(λ ,µ) ]
(34)
which in turn simplifies to εu(N) = 2K/(qN)
2
r+2(λ+µ) verifying that
εu decreases as N increases. It can be similarly shown that ε l
also decreases as N increases. Finally ε¯u is shown below to
equal a positive multiple of εu
ε¯u = α(λ+µ)∆t1−α[1−(λ+µ)∆t ]ε
u,
=
N max(λ ,µ)
r+N max(λ ,µ)∆t
1− N max(λ ,µ)r+N max(λ ,µ) [1−
λ+µ
N max(λ ,µ) ]
εu,
= 1r+λ+µ ε
u.
(35)
3Using the average consumption rate of an active appliance as the unit that
measures capacity, N equals the maximal consumption rate of the cooling
appliances under the SBO’s control.
11
We can now conclude that all three parameters ε¯u, εu and ε l
will approach zero as N goes to infinity. 
Proposition 6 describes the asymptotic impact of building
size described by N on ∆(i, i¯d) and the optimal price policy
u(i, i¯d). According to Propositions 3 and 5, the difference be-
tween differential cost functions for fixed i¯d and i respectively
is bounded by
∆(i+1, i¯d)−∆(i, i¯d) ∈ [ε l ,εu] (36)
and
∆(i, i¯d)−∆(i, i¯d +∆y) ∈ [ε l ,εu+ ε¯u]. (37)
which by Proposition 6 implies that these differences go to 0.
Using the expression for the optimal policy proven in
Proposition 2, we can conclude that u(i, i¯d), u(i+1, i¯d), u(i, i¯d)
and u(i, i¯d +∆y) get closer together as N increases, and as a
result the optimal policy function becomes flatter with respect
to its arguments.
V. NUMERICAL SOLUTION ALGORITHMS
The analytical results presented so far are not merely
exercises in analysis that capture abstract properties of the
DP optimality conditions. Most notably, the optimal policy
structure of Proposition 2 and the monotonicity and second
derivative related properties proven in Propositions 3 to 5 are
valuable ammunition that enable design and implementation
of efficient and scalable numerical solution algorithms. This
section demonstrates the value of the analytical results in doing
just that and provides elaborative computational results.
A. Value Iteration Based Approaches
We first propose and implement two numerical DP solution
algorithms, the first for benchmarking and comparison pur-
poses using the conventional value iteration (CVI) approach
[27], and the second by leveraging the optimal policy structure
proven in Proposition 2 of Section IV which we call assisted
value iteration (AVI) algorithm. The AVI algorithm replaces
the computationally inefficient discretization of the allowable
policy space and exhaustive search over it at each iteration.
We instead use the policy in (20) because it is optimal for
a given value function resembling policy iteration algorithms.
Our AVI algorithm recognizes that the state space is discrete
while the policy space is continuous. It benefits from (1) the
analytic characterization of the optimal policy in terms of the
current iteration estimate of the value function thus avoiding
both state space discretization and exhaustive search for the
optimal policy, and (2) avoidance of the sub-optimality gap
introduced by the policy space discretization.
Numerical results from the CVI and AVI algorithms are
shown in Fig. 7. In the upper sub-figure, the parameter values
used were N = 200, n¯ = 100, R = 20,λ = 2,µ = 0.5. We
choose a linear utility function as in (10) with b = 20. We
find that the CVI algorithm yields policies selected from
the discretized allowable policy set and the AVI algorithm
provides a smooth and continuous policy. The observed price
monotonicity are consistent with properties derived in Theo-
rem 1. The comparison between the two sub-figures demon-
strates the price sensitivity when we increase N and R to the
same proportion. Note that the rate at which the optimal price
increases from u= Tmin to u= Tmax decreases, unsurprisingly,
by a factor of 2. Another interesting observation is that when
N increases, different curves for ISO signals y get closer to
each other for a fixed i. This is consistent with our analysis
of the monotonicity of price sensitivity in Sec. IV-C.
Fig. 7. Optimal policies obtained from the CVI and AVI Algorithms. The
solid (dashed) lines are simulation results of CVI (AVI) algorithm. The red,
green, dark black, black, and light black curves correspond to RSR signal
level at -0.8, -0.4, 0.0, 0.4, 0.8, respectively. In CVI, the policy space is
discretized into 20 possible prices corresponding to the temperature threshold
from 1 to 20. In AVI, the policy space is continuous. Monotonicity properties
in Theorem 1 are verified. Equal Y = yR policy functions demonstrate that
the slope of the price between u = Tmin to u = Tmax decreases as N and R
increase. The vertical distance among price policy lines also decreases.
B. Functional Approximate DP Approach
We proceed to propose a numerical solution algorithm based
on an analytic functional approximation of the value function
J(i,y,D). This algorithm leverages the properties of value
function first and second differences derived in Sec. IV. In
particular we use Proposition 3 which shows that ∆(i+1, i¯d)≥
∆(i, i¯d). Given the discrete state space of our problem, this
property is equivalent to convexity of J(i, i¯d) in the number of
active appliances i for a given pair of ISO signal’s value and
direction.
In addition, we note that from Fig. 7 that the increased rate
of the optimal policy for a fixed RSR signal is approximately
a constant value k. Therefore we approximately have
u(i+1, i¯d)−u(i+1, i¯d) = k, (38)
which is equivalent to have ∆(i+ 1, i¯d)−∆(i, i¯d) being some
constant. Since ∆(i, i¯d) is the differential of the value function
with respect to i, it means that the second order differential of
the value function with respect to i is approximately constant,
namely ∂
2
∂ i2 J(i,y,D) is approximately constant. Similarly, from
Fig. 7 we note that the rate of policy’s vertically changes is
constant for varying RSR signals, therefore the ∂∂ i¯d ∆(i, i¯
d) is
approximately constant, namely ∂∂ i¯d
∂
∂ i J(i, i¯
d) is constant.
These properties motivate an approximation of J(i, i¯d) by
Jˆd(i,y) that is quadratic in i− yR. In fact, we treat D(t) as
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a binary argument and propose the following basis function
approximation when D(t) =−1.
Jˆd(i,y) = r11(i− yR)2+ r12(i− yR)+ r13 (39)
with r11 > 0 to guarantee convexity. In addition, the differential
of the value function with respect to i, namely ∆(i, i¯), is
∂
∂ i
Jˆd(i,y) = ∆(i, i¯) = 2r11(i− yR)+ r12i. (40)
Proposition 4 proved that ∆(i, i¯d) ≥ ∆(i+ 1, i¯d + ∆y) which
suggests that ∂∂ i Jˆd(i,y) monotonically decreases as a function
of i for a fixed e = i− yR, hence r12 < 0 in (40).
We generalize the approximation in (39) by differentiating
the parameters depending on the discrete value of the direction
D, Thus we define for D =−1
Jˆd(i,y,rd) = r1i2+ r2i+ r3y2+ r4y+ r5iy+ r6 (41)
and the corresponding function Jˆu(i,y,ru) for D= 1. The value
function J(i,y,D,r) is then approximated by:
Jˆ(i,y,D,r) = 1{D=1}Jˆu(i,y,ru)+1{D=−1}Jˆd(i,y,rd). (42)
The two components of the expression in (42) approximate
state features associated with increasing or decreasing ISO
signals. The vector r is a vector of twelve parameters six from
rd and ru each. Written in matrix form, (42) is equivalent to
the following
Jˆ =Φr, (43)
where Φ is a |N|× |y|× |D| by 12 matrix with rows being the
feature vector for each state. The functional approximation is
therefore transformed into the problem of solving the projected
Bellman equation
Φr =ΠT (Φr), (44)
where T is the operator of the form T J = g+αPJ with state
transition matrix P. Π is the projection operator onto the set
spanned by the basis functions S = {Φr|r ∈ℜ12}. It is shown
in [27] that the solution to the above projection problem is
given by
r? =C−1d, (45)
where C = Φ′Ξ(I − αP)Φ, d = Φ′Ξg, and Ξ is the matrix
with diagonal elements being the steady state probability
distribution of the states. It is further shown that (45) can
be solved in an iterative form by the projected value iteration
(PVI) algorithm
rk+1 = rk− γGk(Ckrk−dk), (46)
where Ck and dk are given by
Ck = 1k+1
k
∑
t=0
φ(it ,yt ,Dt)(φ(it ,yt ,Dt)−αφ(it+1,yt+1,Dt+1)),
dk = 1k+1
k
∑
t=0
φ(it ,yt ,Dt)g(it ,yt ,Dt ,u(t)).
(47)
To choose γ and Gk, it is proposed to have γ = 1 and
Gk = (
1
k+1
k
∑
t=0
φ(it ,yt ,Dt)φ(it ,yt ,Dt)
′
)−1. (48)
Based on the above approach that finds a good approximation
of the value function for a fixed policy, we successfully use
the following algorithm to construct a good approximation
of the value function as well as the optimal policy based on
sample trajectories obtained by Monte Carlo simulation. The
algorithm contains the following four steps:
ADP Algorithm
Step 1. Initialization r=0.
Step 2. Initialization rold = r, r0 = r, k = 0, {ik,yk,Dk}.
Step 3. Generate
Optimal policy urold(ik,yk,Dk)
Next state {ik+1,yk+1,Dk+1}
Period cost g(ik,yk,Dk,urold(ik,yk,Dk))
Update
Ck,dk, and rk+1 based on (46)–(48)
If k ≥ kmin and ||rk+1− rk||2 < ε¯
r = rk+1, go to Step 4.
Else
k = k+1, go to Step 3.
Step 4. If ||J(i,y,D,r)− J(i,y,D,rold)||∞ < τ
return r? = r. Algorithm ends.
Else go to Step 2.
The algorithm starts with an initial guess of the parameters,
r= 0. Step 2 initializes the iteration count, parameters r0, and
state variables {i0,y0,D0}. Step 3 iteratively updates the value
function for the fixed policy urold using the PVI algorithm
described above. Step 3 is repeated for at least a minimum
number of iterations, k≥ kmin, and stops when the chage in r
meets a desired tolerance, ||rk+1−rk||2 < ε¯ . Steps 4 compares
the value function parametrized by rold and the updated r
obtained by step 3. If the infinity norm of the vector is less
than the threshold τ , then the value function converges and
the algorithm returns the optimal parameter r? = r. Else, it
returns to step 2 for a new iteration.
C. Comparison between Value Iteration Algorithms and the
ADP
We compare the computational performance of the CVI,
AVI and Functional ADP algorithms for different state space
size problems in Table I. Based on the optimal condition
derived in Proposition 2, the AVI algorithm is effective in
reducing the computational time by approximately 90% since
the optimal policy per state and per iteration is calculated on
the fly based on the current value function. However, it is
not fast for large problems up to 400,000 states since it needs
more than 2 hours to solve for the optimal policy. Considering
that the RSR is bid and served for every one hour, the AVI
algorithm may not be practical for real time implementation,
especially when the RSR provision capacity of the energy
provider is huge. However, the functional approximation based
ADP algorithm further reduces the computational time by
more than 90% from the AVI algorithm. In fact, in the inner
loop described in Algorithm 1, the number of states visited
in Monte Carlo simulation is approximately 10% of all the
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states. As for the outer loop, it also needs few iterations for
the convergence of the value function compared to the AVI
algorithm. Therefore the total computational time is reduced
for more than 90%.
TABLE I
COMPUTATIONAL PERFORMANCES OF THE THREE ALGORITHMS
Problem Size (|N| ∗ |y| ∗ |D|) 50*21*2 500*41*2 5000*41*2
CVI Computation Time (sec) 200.35 6761.2 66082
AVI Computation Time (sec) 20.14 596.65 9489.5
ADP Computation Time (sec) 2.69 34.2 514.8
We examine the convergence result of the proposed algo-
rithm. The coefficient vector r is composed of 12 parameters,
six for each direction D= 1,−1. Fig. 8 shows the convergence
result of the six parameters for direction D=−1 proposed by
the ADP algorithm. We find all parameters would converge
after 10 iterations. The convergence of r also indicates the
convergence of the value function Jˆ.
Fig. 8. Convergence of the feature parameters in (41). The coefficients of the
six basis converge after 10 iterations. Convergence of the feature parameters
indicates the convergence of the value function approximation Jˆ.
Fig. 9 compares the converged value function and the
corresponding optimal policy generated by the AVI and the
functional ADP. Left column figures are plots of the value
function generated by the AVI and the functional ADP algo-
rithm corresponding to ISO RSR signal direction D = 1. The
functional ADP algorithm learns the convex structure of the
value function accurately. The error between Jˆ(i,y,D,r) and
J(i,y,D) is relatively small. Right column figures compare
the optimal policies of Proposition 2 that are generated by
the value functions based on the functional ADP and the
AVI algorithm. The functional ADP algorithm performs well
relative to the AVI algorithm that derives the true optimal
policy.
D. RSR Provision Quality with Dynamic Preference
We validate the tracking performance of the ADP algorithm
optimal control with RSR signals from PJM. To illustrate
the improvement gained by having dynamic preference, we
Fig. 9. Left column figures compare at the top the value functions obtained by
the functional approximation DP algorithm and the AVI algorithm, and plot
the error at the bottom. Right column figures plot the corresponding optimal
policy and the error amongst them. Results indicates that the functional
approximation DP algorithm captures the properties proven in section IV.
compare results to RSR provision where the optimal policy
is generated based on the assumption of time invariant con-
sumers’ preference, namely to assume that consumers’ prefer-
ences distribution is statically uniformly distributed regardless
of time. In this simulation we assume that there are 20,000
appliances within the aggregator each consuming 1kW of
energy. The aggregator has mean consumption of 10,000 kW
and provide 2,000 kW up (down) reserve to the market, namely
10% of its total capacity. Fig. 10 shows the comparison of
the tracking performance between the two assumptions. The
red curve is the reference PJM signal at a frequency of 4
seconds. The black curves are the tracking performance (upper
figure) and the tracking error (lower figure) that result from
the dynamic preferences optimal control. The green curves are
results from the static preferences optimal control. In general,
both approaches are effective in providing demand side RSR
with tracking error controlled within 5%. Nonetheless, the
tracking provided by dynamic preference assumption achieves
higher accuracy. The accuracy can be seen based on the
statistics in Table II. The mean tracking error is decreased from
86MW to 79MW if dynamic preference is applied, namely
a mean error reduction of 8%. The min and max tracking
error spikes are also decrease by 12% and 17%, respectively.
As to the aggregator, the sum of squared tracking penalty is
decreased significantly by 9.4%.
Converting tracking error to the system operation perspec-
tive, with more accurate dynamic preference modeling, the
system will have 8% less total reserve generation and 17% less
peak reserve generation from traditional thermal units. These
will provide significant operation values since these capacity
can otherwise be committed as energy, rather than reserve, and
thus possibly lower the overall energy costs across the system
either in the day ahead or real time market clearing.
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Fig. 10. Comparison of the optimal control generated based on the assumption
of dynamic preference vs. static uniform preference. In both assumptions,
the optimal control can track the trend of RSR signal. Dynamic preferences
optimal control tracks with better statistical performances of the tracking error
(mean, standard deviation, max, and min) than the uniform preference optimal
control.
TABLE II
DYNAMIC VS. STATIC PREFERENCE RSR PROVISION QUALITY
Statistics Dynamic Preference Static Preference
Mean Error (kW) 79.18 86.26
Std.Dev. Error (kW) 62.31 68.25
Min Error (kW) -437 -492
Max Error (kW) 342 410
Sum of Squared Penalty 913330 1008400
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper relaxes a common, but unrealistic assumption
in the dynamic pricing literature, which, for the sake of
simplifying the analysis of the resulting problem formulation,
claims that it is reasonable to approximate the preferences of
market participants with a static, usually uniform, distribution
that is independent of control history. We show that a dy-
namically evolving trapezoidal pdf captures the dynamics of
market participant preferences in the cooling appliance duty
cycle paradigm considered here, proceed to model dynamic
preferences, and succeed to overcome the complexity that it
introduces. We believe that dynamic, control driven evolution
of preferences can be modeled and analyzed in more general
contexts. Under preference dynamics modeling, we derive
an analytic expressions of the optimal policy, monotonicity
properties of the value function, and the behavior of the
optimal policy. We also prove the existence of policy sensitiv-
ity bounds and their asymptotic convergence as the number
of the duty cycle appliances increase. The aforementioned
analytical results prove invaluable in guiding us to design
and implement efficient and scalable numerical solution algo-
rithms. Simulation based on PJM signals shows the advantage
of RSR provision under dynamic preference modeling over
static modeling assumptions. In future work we will consider
to prove the convergence of the ADP algorithm, to embed
additional sufficient statistics into the dynamic preference, and
to model imperfect state observation where the utility function
or the preferences cannot be observed.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Proof. (1) For a sequence of J0(i, i¯d), . . . ,Jk(i, i¯d) generated
by value iteration, we have lim
k→∞
Jk(i, i¯d) = J(i, i¯d) based on the
value iteration convergence property. We define the differential
of the value function at the kth iteration as
∆k(i, i¯d) = Jk(i, i¯d)− Jk(i−1, i¯d).
It follows that lim
k→∞
∆k(i, i¯d) = ∆(i, i¯d).
We assume ∆k(i+ 1, i¯d) ≥ ∆k(i, i¯d)+ ε lk and ∆k(i+ 1, i¯u) ≥
∆k(i, i¯u)+ε lk with ε
l
k = 0 for all {i, i¯d}, {i, i¯u} and k= 0, which
holds trivially when at the initial iteration the value function
is taken to equal zero. At iteration k+ 1, Jk+1(i, i¯d) can be
written using the Bellman equation as
Jk+1(i, i¯d) = g(i, i¯d)−λ (N− i)φ(∆(i+1, i¯d))+
α
{
[1− (γd1 + γd2 )]Jk(i, i¯d)−µi∆k(i, i¯d)
+(γd1 Jk(i, i¯
u+∆y)+ γd2 Jk(i, i¯
d−∆y))},
(49)
Starting with the definition of ∆k(i+1, i¯d), we can write
∆k+1(i+1, i¯d)
= Jk+1(i+1, i¯d)− Jk+1(i, i¯d),
= [g(i+1, i¯d)−g(i, i¯d)]+α{[1− γd1 − γd2 ]∆k(i+1, i¯d)
−µ(i+1)∆k(i+1, i¯d)+µi∆k(i, i¯d)
+γd1∆k(i+1, i¯
u+∆y)+ γd2∆k(i+1, i¯
d−∆y)}
−λ (N− i−1)φ(∆k(i+2, i¯d))
+λ (N− i)φ(∆k(i+1, i¯d)),
This can be used to derive the change in ∆k+1(i, i¯d) when i
increases by one,
∆k+1(i+1, i¯d)−∆k+1(i, i¯d)
= g(i+1, i¯d)−2g(i, i¯d)+g(i−1, i¯d)
+α
{
(1− γd1 − γd2 )[∆k(i+1, i¯d)−∆k(i, i¯d)]
−µ(i+1)[∆k(i+1, i¯d)−∆k(i, i¯d)]
+µ(i−1)[∆k(i, i¯d)−∆k(i−1, i¯d)]
+γd1 [∆k(i+1, i¯
u+∆y)−∆k(i, i¯u+∆y)]
+γd2 [∆k(i+1, i¯
d−∆y)−∆k(i, i¯d−∆y)]
}
−λ (N− i−1)[φ(∆k(i+2, i¯d))−φ(∆k(i+1, i¯d))]
+λ (N− i+1)[φ(∆k(i+1, i¯d))−φ(∆k(i, i¯d))].
(50)
From Lemma 2,
φ(∆k(i+2, i¯d))−φ(∆k(i+1, i¯d))≤−α pu(i+1,i¯d)[∆(i+2, i¯d)−∆(i+1, i¯d)],
φ(∆k(i+1, i¯d))−φ(∆k(i, i¯d))≥−α pu(i−1,i¯d)[∆(i+1, i¯d)−∆(i, i¯d)].
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We substitute the above two inequalities into (50),
∆k+1(i+1, i¯d)−∆k+1(i, i¯d)
≥ g(i+1, i¯d)−2g(i, i¯)+g(i−1, i¯d)
α{[1− γd1 − γd2 −µ(i+1)][∆k(i+1, i¯d)−∆k(i, i¯d)]
+µ(i−1)[∆k(i, i¯d)−∆k(i−1, i¯d)]
+γd1 [∆k(i+1, i¯
u+∆y)−∆k(i, i¯u+∆y)]
+γd2 [∆k(i+1, i¯
d−∆y)−∆k(i, i¯d−∆y)]}
−λ (N− i+1)pu(i−1,i¯d)[∆k(i+1, i¯d)−∆k(i, i¯d)]
+λ (N− i−1)pu(i+1,i¯d)[∆k(i+2, i¯d)−∆k(i+1, i¯d)]
≥ 2κ+α[1−2(λ +µ)−λ (N− i)(pu(i−1,i¯d)− pu(i+1,i¯d))]ε lk
≥ 2κ+α[1−2(λ +µ)−λ (N−N1)]ε lk
(51)
The second inequality holds since the following four terms are
greater or equal than ε lk based on the assumption at iteration
k: ∆k(i+1, i¯d)−∆k(i, i¯d), ∆k(i, i¯d)−∆k(i−1, i¯d), ∆k(i+1, i¯u+
∆y)−∆k(i, i¯u+∆y), ∆k(i+1, i¯d−∆y)−∆k(i, i¯d−∆y).
Denote υ = λ (N−N1) and ε lk+1 = 2κ +α[1− 2(λ + µ)−
υ ]ε lk. It can be now seen that
∆k+1(i+1, i¯d)−∆k+1(i, i¯d)≥ ε lk+1 (52)
holds for all {i, i¯d} at iteration k+1. Similarly we can prove
∆k+1(i+1, i¯u)−∆k+1(i, i¯u)≥ ε lk+1. (53)
By mathematical induction, it is easy to show that
∆k(i+1, i¯d)−∆k(i, i¯d)≥ ε lk,∆k(i+1, i¯u)−∆k(i, i¯u)≥ ε lk (54)
holds for all k in the infinite series ε lk generated recursively
by
ε lk+1 = 2κ+α[1−2(λ +µ)−υ ]ε lk. (55)
Since ε l0 = 0, ε
l
k must converge for k→∞. In fact, it converges
to ε l with
ε l = lim
k→∞
ε lk =
2κ
1−α[1−2(λ +µ)−υ ] (56)
And we can hence conclude that
∆(i+1, i¯d)−∆(i, i¯d)
= lim
k→∞
[∆k(i+1, i¯d)−∆k(i, i¯d)],
≥ lim
k→∞
ε lk = ε
l .
(2) Assuming ∆(i, i¯d)+ εuk ≥ ∆(i+1, i¯d) holds with εuk = 0
for all {i, i¯d} and k = 0, Lemma 2 implies
−(φ(∆(i+2, i¯d))−φ(∆(i+1, i¯d)))≤α pu(i,i¯d)[∆(i+2, i¯d)−∆(i+1, i¯d)],
φ(∆(i+1, i¯d))−φ(∆(i, i¯d))≤−α pu(i,i¯d)(∆(i+1, i¯d))−∆(i, i¯d)).
Substituting the above two inequalities into (50) we get
∆k+1(i+1, i¯d)−∆k+1(i, i¯d)
≤ g(i+1, i¯d)−2g(i, i¯d)+g(i−1, i¯d)
+α
{
(1− γd1 − γd2 −µ(i+1)−λ (N− i+1)pu(i,i¯d))
[∆k(i+1, i¯d)−∆k(i, i¯d)]
+µ(i−1)[∆k(i, i¯d)−∆k(i−1, i¯d)]
+γd1 [∆k(i+1, i¯
u+∆y)−∆k(i, i¯u+∆y)]
+γd2 [∆k(i+1, i¯
d−∆y)−∆k(i, i¯d−∆y)]
}
+λ (N− i−1)α pu(i,i¯d)εuk
≤ 2κ+α[1−2(λ +µ)]εuk
The second inequality holds since the following four terms are
smaller or equal than εuk based on our assumption at iteration
k: ∆k(i+1, i¯d)−∆k(i, i¯d), ∆k(i, i¯d)−∆k(i−1, i¯d), ∆k(i+1, i¯d +
∆y)−∆k(i, i¯d+∆y), ∆k(i+1, i¯d−∆y)−∆k(i, i¯d−∆y). Denoting
εuk+1 = 2κ+α[1−2(λ +µ)]εuk , it can be seen that
∆k+1(i+1, i¯d)−∆k+1(i, i¯d)≤ εuk+1 (57)
for all {i, i¯d} at iteration k+1. Similarly we can prove
∆k+1(i+1, i¯u)−∆k+1(i, i¯u)≤ εuk+1 (58)
By mathematical induction, we conclude that
∆k(i+1, i¯d)−∆k(i, i¯d)≤ εuk ,∆k(i+1, i¯u)−∆k(i, i¯u)≤ εuk (59)
holds for all k in the infinite series εuk generated recursively
by
εuk+1 = 2κ+α[1−2(λ +µ)]εuk . (60)
Since εu0 = 0, ε
u
k must converge as k→∞. Indeed it converges
to εu with
εu = lim
k→∞
εuk =
2κ
1−α[1−2(λ +µ)] . (61)
Hence we have
∆(i+1, i¯d)−∆(i, i¯d)
= lim
k→∞
[∆k(i+1, i¯d)−∆k(i, i¯d)],
≤ lim
k→∞
εuk = ε
u.
And this concludes the proof of Proposition 3. 
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